The uncomfortable truth
Early-stage AWS accounts accumulate risk quietly: admin keys in CI, IAM users nobody remembers, secrets in environment variables, no logging on the things that matter. None of it hurts — until it's the headline, or until an enterprise prospect's security questionnaire exposes it mid-deal.
What I harden
- Identity & access — least-privilege IAM, SSO, MFA enforcement, key rotation and removal
- Account architecture — org structure, guardrails, and isolation between environments
- Secrets management — out of env vars and repos, into proper secret stores
- Detection — CloudTrail, GuardDuty, and alerting that reaches a human
- Vulnerability management — patching cadence and dependency scanning that actually runs
What you get
- A findings report ranked by real-world risk, not scanner noise
- The critical fixes implemented, the rest road-mapped
- Incident-response runbooks — who does what when something looks wrong
- Optional ongoing monitoring as part of a retainer